DESPITE A LARGE AND SOPHISTICATED LITERATURE there is still substantial disagreement over the extent to which differences in the structure of wages between union and nonunion workers represent an effect of trade unions, rather than a consequence of the nonrandom selection of unionized workers. Over the past decade several alternative approaches have been developed to control for unobserved heterogeneity between union and nonunion workers.2 One method that has been successfully applied in other areas of applied microeconometrics is the use of longitudinal data to measure the wage gains or losses of workers who change union status. Unfortunately, longitudinal estimators are highly sensitive to measurement error: even a small fraction of misclassified union status changes can lead to significant biases if the true rate of mobility between union and nonunion jobs is low. This sensitivity led Lewis (1986) to essentially dismiss the longitudinal evidence in his landmark survey of union wage effects.
In this paper I present some new evidence on the union wage effect, based on a longitudinal estimator that explicitly accounts for misclassification errors in reported union status. The estimator uses external information on union status misclassification rates, along with the reduced-form coefficients from a multivariate regression of wages on the observed sequence of union status indicators, to isolate the causal effect of unions from any selection biases introduced by a correlation between union status and the permanent component of unobserved wage heterogeneity. Recognizing that unions may raise wages more or less for workers of different skill levels, and that the selection process into unionized jobs may generate different selection biases for workers with different levels of observed skills, the econometric model is estimated separately for five skill groups using a large panel data set formed from the 1987 and 1988 Current Population Surveys.
Simple cross-sectional estimates of the union-nonunion wage gap are large and positive for workers with lower levels of observed skills (35 percent for workers in the lowest quintile of the distribution of observed skills) and negative for workers with the highest levels of observed skills (-10 percent for workers in the upper quintile of observed skills). Estimates from a measurement-errorcorrected longitudinal estimator suggest that this pattern arises from a combination of a larger union wage effect for less-skilled workers and opposing patterns of selection bias for unionized workers from the upper and lower tails of the observed skill distribution. Among workers with lower levels of observable skills, union members are positively selected, leading to a positive bias in the OLS union wage gap. Among workers with higher levels of observable skill, on the other hand, union members are negatively selected, leading to a negative bias in the OLS union wage gap. Perhaps surprisingly, estimates for a pooled sample indicate essentially no selection bias, suggesting that the opposing selection biases for more-and less-skilled workers approximately "cancel" in the overall workforce. These findings shed some new light on the nature of the union selection process, and suggest that both employer and employee incentives affect the nature of the unobserved differences between union and nonunion workers.
A CORRELATED RANDOM EFFECT MODEL WITH MISCLASSIFICATION ERRORS
This section outlines a longitudinal estimation technique for identifying the relative wage effect of unions in the presence of unobserved heterogeneity between union and nonunion workers and misclassification errors in measured union status.3 As a starting point it is useful to consider the effects of measurement error in a model with no correlation between union status and unobserved productivity components. Let wi represent the logarithm of wages of individual i in some time period and let u* represent an indicator variable for the true union status of i in that period. Assume that wages are determined by 3 Jakubson (1990) presents a similar model. Unlike Jakubson, I assume that external information is available on the misclassification rates of union status. 4 Note that the union wage effect is assumed to be constant across individuals. In the empirical work later in the paper this assumption is relaxed by estimating separate models by skill group. Actual union status u* is unobserved: instead, an indicator ui is observed that is only imperfectly correlated with u*. Throughout this paper I assume that the process generating observed union status is of a particularly simple form, with a constant probability q1 of observing ui = 1 when u* = 1, and a constant probability q0 <q1 of observing ui = 1 when u* = O.' These assumptions, together with the assumption that u* is orthogonal to Ei, imply that observed union status is orthogonal to Ei.6 Letting -,T denote the true fraction of union workers in the population, the observed union rate is p = qllr + qo(1 -IT).
To determine the relationship between wages and observed union status, consider the auxiliary regression where yo is the attenuation coefficient in a model with no other covariates. Note that the addition of x's that are correlated with true union status (i.e., that lead to an R2 > 0) exacerbates the attenuation effect of measurement error.8 Suppose that consistent estimates of qo and q1 are available. Then a consistent estimate of the true union wage effect 8 can be obtained in two steps by first estimating an unrestricted regression of wages on observed union status and the x's (providing a consistent estimate of 8yi), and then using the estimates of qo and ql, together with estimates of the observed fraction of union workers and the R2 coefficient from a linear probability model of observed union status, to form a consistent estimate of the attenuation coefficient yi from equation (4).
Allowingfor a Correlation Between Union Status and Unobserved
Wage Determinants
The preceding analysis relies on the maintained assumption that union status is orthogonal to the unobserved components of wages. The availability of multiple observations on wages and union status for the same individual over time provides an opportunity to relax this assumption. Specifically, suppose that the observed wage of individual i in period t is determined by where the union history '00' is treated as the omitted category. If true union status is unobservable then these equations are not directly estimable. As in a one-period model, however, it is possible to express wages in terms of the observed union status indicators using a series of auxiliary regressions. Let Ui = (Uilo Uiol il) represent a vector of observed union history dummies (treating the indicator for a '00' history as the omitted category), and consider the set of auxiliary regressions: If union status misclassification rates are constant across individuals and constant over time (as specified by equation (9) (8)). I also estimate linear probability models for the observed union status indicators as functions of the observed x-variables (providing estimates of c and Vx1). I then combine the 6 reduced-form union status coefficients from equations (8) with estimates of the sample fractions of each observed union history (3 estimated probabilities) and use a second-stage minimum-distance estimator to fit these 9 sample moments as functions of the 7 structural parameters (8, c1f, o 1, 'kl, vlo, VOP rsl), treating q0, q1, Vxx, and c as fixed constants.1" The second stage models are over-identified with 2 degrees of freedom, providing a test of the assumptions underlying the model.
ESTIMATING THE MISCLASSIFICATION RATE OF UNION COVERAGE IN THE CPS
The estimation procedure outlined above relies on the availability of external information on union status misclassification rates. In the empirical work reported below I apply the procedure to a panel data set formed from the 1987 and 1988 Current Population Surveys. A distinctive feature of the Current Population Survey (CPS) is the availability of information from a 1977 validation survey that was designed to measure the reliability of employee-provided job data. This survey collected wage and union status information for a sample of workers, and then gathered the same data from each respondent's employer.12 The 1977 validation survey provides a unique source of information on the misclassification rates in CPS union-status questions.13 Table I These simple cross-tabulations display two striking features: (i) in each table, the two off-diagonal probabilities are approximately equal; and (ii) the off-diagonal probabilities are similar across sectors, even though the overall unionization rate is much higher in manufacturing than in trade and services. Most analysts of the CPS validation survey have assumed that the employer responses to the union status question are "true" and that the employee responses are measured with error.14 Under this assumption, however, a symmetric cross-tabulation will only arise if the relative error rates of union and nonunion workers vary with the odds of union coverage. In particular, if the true unionization rate is w, and the employers' responses are correct, then the probability that the employer reports coverage and the employee reports noncoverage is i(1 -ql), whereas the probability that the employer reports noncoverage and the employee reports coverage is (1 -r)qo. Symmetry of the cross-tabulation therefore requires qo/(1 -q1) = w/(1 -). In the manufacturing sector, iT .5, implying that the false positive rate and false negative rate are about equal for manufacturing workers. In trade and services, on the other hand, T -.2, implying that the false negative rate is 4 times greater than the false positive rate in that sector.
An alternative to the hypothesis that relative error rates vary systematically by industry is that both employer and employee responses are measured with error, and that the misclassification rates are about equal. To pursue this idea, suppose that union and nonunion employers and employees all have the same probability q of reporting the incorrect union status. Then the cross-tabulations in Table I are functions of only two parameters: the true fraction of union coverage (XW) and the misclassification rate (q = = 1 -q1). It is easy to see that in this "symmetric misclassification model" the off-diagonal probabilities of the crosstabulation will be equal and independent of the true level of union coverage.15 Both features are displayed in Table I. A more formal way to test the symmetric misclassification model is by a goodness-of-fit test-the model has 2 parameters and can be fit to the 3 independent elements of the cross-tabulation by minimum chi-square methods. The best fit to the overall table (in Panel 1) yields q = 0.027 and IT = 0.321: the associated test statistic is 0.10 (with 1 degree of freedom). The misclassification rate is estimated relatively precisely, with a standard error of 0.0014. Assuming a 2.7% misclassification rate but treating the true union density as a free parameter gives chi-squared statistics of 0.24 for manufacturing (with IT = 0.485) and 0.21 for trade and services (with w = 0.167). This simple model therefore provides an acceptable fit to the overall and sector-specific cross-tabulations.
14 See, e.g., Mellow and Sider (1983) . This was apparently the assumption that motivated the design of the study.
i The probability of observing either of the conflicting classifications is 7r(1 -q)q + (1 -7r)q(l -q) = q(l -q), independent of 7r. Further evidence of symmetric measurement errors in the employers' and employees' union coverage responses is presented in Table II. This table shows the estimated union status coefficients from cross-sectional wage regressions fit to the January 1977 CPS sample using three alternative union measures: the worker-reported measure (row 1); the firm-reported measure (row 2), and their product (row 3). Columns 1-3 present estimated union coefficients from models with no other covariates, whereas columns 4-6 present coefficients from models that include a standard set of control variables (education, potential experience and its square, race, region dummies, and industry and occupation dummies).
If employers' union responses are treated as correct, then the attenuation formulas developed in Section 1 imply that the coefficients in columns 1, 2, and 3, should be related in the ratios of 1.00:0.89:0.96.16 On the other hand, if employers and employees are assumed to have the same misclassification rates, the predicted ratio of the coefficients is 1.00: 1.00: 1.04.17 Assuming that union status error rates are constant across individuals (and employers), the predicted 16 In the absence of other control variables, the expected attenuation of the estimated union coefficient is (lTql -p-r)/p(l -p), where 1T is the true union rate, p is the mean of the observed union indicator, and q1 is the probability of observed union status, given true status. Assuming that the employer response is correct the data in the upper panel of Table I imply 7r = 0.331 and q, = 0.92 for the employee response. An indicator formed from the product of the employer and employee responses has the same probability of a correct classification given true union coverage (i.e., q1 = 0.92) and has mean iTql. 17 If employer and employee responses have the same misclassification rates, then the probability that both responses are 1 given true union coverage is (q1)2, where q1 is the probability that either the worker or the firm reports union coverage when it is true. ratios of the coefficients across the models with other control variables are approximately equal to the ratios in models without covariates, since observed union coverage has a relatively low coefficient of multiple correlation with the covariates included in Table II (see equation (4)).
Inspection of the coefficient estimates in Table II reveals that the union wage effects are approximately equal when union status is measured by either the employer's response or the employee's response, but rise when union status is measured by the product of their responses. This pattern is inconsistent with the assumption that the employers' responses are error-free, but is fully consistent with the hypothesis of equal misclassification rates in the employer and employee responses. Based on this evidence, and the cross-tabulations in Table I surveys. The algorithm compares the men in a particular household in 1987 to the men in the same household in 1988, and computes a match probability for each potential pair. The match probabilities depend on age, race, education, and marital status. Each person in the 1987 sample is then assigned his "best match," and deleted from the sample if the match probability falls below a critical value.
A relatively conservative critical value for the match probability yields an overall match rate of 69 percent.21 A key correlate of the matching rate is age-the match rate rises from 50 percent for 25 year olds to around 80 percent for individuals over age 55. Match rates are also higher for whites than nonwhites (69.6% versus 62.7%), and for union than nonunion workers (73.2% versus 67.2%), but are fairly similar across occupation and education categories. Table III 
UNION EFFECTS BY POSITION IN THE WAGE DISTRIBUTION
This section applies the estimation method outlined in Section 1 to the matched 1987-1988 CPS sample. Recognizing that the union wage effect may vary with a worker's skill level, and that the selection process into unionized jobs may lead to differing selection biases at different skill levels, the models are estimated separately for five different "skill groups." The groups are defined by quintiles of predicted wages in the nonunion sector, using an equation fit to an independent sample of workers in the 1987 and 1988 CPS.
A. Defining the Predicted Wage Quintiles
To develop a simple index of skill I fit a flexible wage equation to the pooled sample of nonunion workers in the "unmatchable" subset of the 1987 and 1988 CPS file (i.e., individuals in the 1987 CPS who would not be interviewed in 1988 
B. Estimation Results
Table V reports information on the union status probabilities and union wage differentials for men in the matched 1987-1988 CPS data set. The sample is stratified into 5 quintiles using the same cutoffs for the predicted wage quintiles as in Table IV.25 The first 2 columns of the table report Columns 5-7 of Table V give the sample fractions of each of the four possible union histories in each skill group. The fractions of union joiners and union leavers range from 4 to 5 percent, with relatively higher rates of mobility in the lower quintiles. Presumably, not all of the observed union transitions reflect a true change in union status. Indeed, if the misclassification rate is 2.8 percent, then one would expect to see a 2.7 percent union joining rate and a 2.7 percent union leaving rate, even in the absence of any real mobility between sectors. Close to one-half of the observed union status transitions over a two year period therefore can be attributed to measurement error.
Columns 8-13 give the reduced form wage coefficients corresponding to equations (8a) and (8b) in Section 1. In addition to a set of indicators for observed union status (whose coefficients are reported) the models include the same set of education, race, potential experience, and region variables used to form the predicted wage quintiles. Inspection of the coefficients of the observed union status variables suggests that some of the differences of the cross-sectional union wage gap across skill groups are attributable to differences in the unobserved characteristics of union and nonunion workers in each group. For example, the coefficient of the '01' history for 1987 wages is large and positive for quintiles 1 and 2, and large and negative for quintiles 4 and 5. Since individuals with a '01' history are nonunion in 1987 (ignoring measurement errors) these coefficients suggest that union joiners with lower observed skills have unobserved characteristics that generate above-average wages in the nonunion sector, whereas union joiners with higher observed skills have unobserved characteristics that generate below-average wages in the nonunion sector.
In the absence of measurement error, a simple method for eliminating unobserved heterogeneity between union and nonunion workers is to examine the wage changes of union joiners and leavers. These can be computed directly from the coefficients in Table V Table VI , along with their associated standard errors. Compared to the cross-sectional estimates, these "fixed effects" estimates show less variation across skill groups, and suggest a uniformly positive union wage effect. It should be noted, however, that any reporting errors in observed union status will attenuate the measured wage gains or losses of observed union joiners or leavers. Furthermore, if misclassification rates are constant across skill groups, the degree of attenuation will tend to be higher for groups with lower observed union transition rates.27
The two-step estimation strategy described in Section 1 identifies the union wage effect in the presence of both unobserved heterogeneity and misclassification errors in union status. Results from the second-stage estimation, applied separately for each quintile and for the sample as a whole, are presented in Table VII . The models are estimated using the reduced-form coefficients for the observed union indicators in Table V as well the estimated fractions of each union history. The estimation assumes a fixed 2.8% misclassification rate, and uses the estimated coefficients from linear probability models for the observed union histories in each quintile.28 Parameter estimates are reported in the first 7 columns of the table, along with a goodness-of-fit statistic in the eighth column. The two right-hand columns give implied estimates of two of the key auxiliary 27 To check if misclassification rates vary across skill groups I divided the men in the 1977 CPS into predicted wage quintiles and computed the cross-tabulations of employer and employee union responses by quintile. The assumption of a fixed misclassification rate is easily accepted in all the quintiles. 28As specified in equation (11), these models are estimated for the observed '01', '10', and '11' histories using the same set of covariates included in the reduced-form wage models in Table V . The R-squared coefficients of the models range from 1-3 percent (for the models of the probability of an observed union joiner or leaver) to 8-10 percent (for the models of the probability of an observed union stayer). As suggested by the pattern of wage changes for union joiners and leavers, the measurement-error corrected longitudinal estimators of the union wage effect are uniformly positive, and are much less variable across quintiles than the cross-sectional wage gap. Interestingly, for the sample as a whole the corrected estimator is almost identical to the cross-sectional wage gap (17 percent versus 15-16 percent). At the extremes of the skill distribution, however, the corrected longitudinal estimator is much different: smaller than the cross-sectional estimator for the lowest quintiles (indicating a positive correlation between union coverage and the unobserved determinants of wages) and larger than the cross-sectional estimator for the highest quintiles (indicating a negative correlation between unionization and the unobserved determinants of wages). These results suggest that union workers with low levels of observed skill are positively selected, whereas union workers with high levels of observed skill are negatively selected. For union workers as a whole the selection biases for low-and high-skilled workers approximately offset each other.
The implied auxiliary regression coefficients relating indicators for the observed union transitions to the corresponding true transitions range from 25-50 percent, with slightly higher values for the lower wage quintiles. These estimates imply that union status misclassification errors lead to a 50-75 percent attenuation in the average wage changes of observed union joiners and leavers, relative to the true wage changes of actual joiners or leavers.
As noted above, the second-stage structural models are over-identified with 2 degrees of freedom. The goodness-of-fit test statistics in Table VII are all below the corresponding 5% critical value (5.99). This suggests that the maintained assumptions of the statistical model-in particular the assumption that the transitory wage shocks are uncorrelated with true union status-are consistent with the data.
The structural parameter estimates, and especially the union wage effect 8, are relatively sensitive to the value of the misclassification rate assumed in the estimation. Table VIII shows the estimated values of 8 under 3 alternative assumptions: q = 0.028 (the base case); p = 0.025 (a low estimate of the misclassification rate, given the evidence in Table I ); and p = 0.031 (a high estimate). Higher values of the misclassification rate lead to larger estimates of the union wage effect, although the pattern of the estimated wage effects across quintiles is preserved.
The fourth and fifth columns of Table VIII report the results of two other specification checks. The parameter estimates in column 4 are obtained from reduced-form models with no, other control variables. This specification is particularly simple because without additional x's, the auxiliary regression coefficients Yh depend only on the misclassification rates and true union status probabilities, and are independent of the parameters of the linear probability models for the observed union status indicators (see equation (12)). The estimates of the union wage effects are very similar to the basis-case estimates from reduced-form models that include an extensive list of covariates. The estimates in column 5 are obtained from reduced-form models that include all the control variables used in Table V as well as one-digit industry effects for the reported industry in each year.29 Again, the estimated union wage effects are very similar to the basis-case estimates.30
In summary, the results of the structural estimation suggest two substantive conclusions. First, although a simple cross-sectional estimator provides a roughly unbiased estimator of the "true" union wage effect for a pooled sample of all workers together, the biases at either tail of the skill distribution are significant. The biases in the upper and lower tails are in opposite direction, with evidence of positive selection among union workers with lower observed skills and negative selection among union workers with higher observed skills. Second, even correcting for these selection biases, the union wage effect is bigger for workers with lower levels of observed skill.
INTERPRETATION OF THE RESULTS
What do these findings imply about the effects of unionization on the overall wage structure and the nature of the selection process into unionized jobs? One immediate implication of the finding that the "true" union wage effect is larger for less-skilled workers is that wage differences between broad skill groups tend to be compressed in the union sector. This is consistent with a long literature which finds that wage differentials by age, education, and region are typically smaller for unionized workers (see Lewis (1986) for a critical review of this literature).
A second implication of the results in Tables VII and VIII is that structural models which assume that the probability of union coverage is determined by a "single index" of observed and unobserved characteristics may be too restrictive. Most structural analyses of the union wage effect posit a three-equation model, consisting of an equation for the union wage for a given individual, an equation for the nonunion wage of the same individual, and a third equation defining a latent index (Ii) that determines the relative likelihood of holding a union job (see Lee (1978) and Robinson (1989) , for example). In this class of models, the conditional expectation of any unobserved wage determinants given observed union status is a function only of the index Ii. Thus the selectivity biases in the union-nonunion wage gap are the same for any two groups of workers with the same probability of holding a union job. As shown in Table IV Contrary to this prediction, however, the results in Table VII suggest that the selection biases are of opposite sign for these two groups. In fact, the patterns of the selection biases by skill group and the tendency for unionized workers to be drawn from the middle of the skill distribution are more consistent with a two-sided selection model that incorporates both employer and employee behavior in the union selection process (see Abowd and Farber (1982) ). To illustrate this point, suppose that the general productivity of a given individual (gi) consists of two components:
where zi is an observable factor and ai represents a productivity component that is observed by labor market participants but is unobserved in a conventional data set. Suppose that the wage in a nonunion job for a worker with general productivity gi is This simple two-sided selection model has three implications that are broadly consistent with the findings in the previous section. First, by assumption, the "true" union-nonunion wage gap is lower for more highly skilled workers. Second, since highly productive workers are less likely to want to work in the union sector, whereas unionized employers are less likely to want to hire a low-productivity worker, the union sector is predicted to include more workers from the "middle" of the skill distribution, and relatively few workers from either tail. Finally, conditional on a high level of observed skill, the worker's selection criterion (14a) is more likely to be binding than the firm's selection criterion (14b). Thus, for workers of higher levels of observed skill, those in the union sector are more likely to have negative values of the unobserved skill component ai (i.e., a negative selection bias). On the other hand, conditional on a low level of observed skill, the firm's selection criterion is more likely to be binding than the worker's selection criterion. Unionized workers with lower levels of observed skill are therefore more likely to have higher values of ai (i.e., a positive selection bias).
While a model with a two-sided selection process is broadly consistent with the findings in this paper, more research is clearly required to fully understand the effects of unions on the structure of wages, and to model the union selection process. In particular, the development and testing of a fully-specified dynamic model for wages and union status remain for future work. 
